diff --git a/opsec/cloud_provider_adversary/index.html b/opsec/cloud_provider_adversary/index.html index 858ae05..08e6e28 100644 --- a/opsec/cloud_provider_adversary/index.html +++ b/opsec/cloud_provider_adversary/index.html @@ -133,12 +133,6 @@ in this post we are going to do a threat modelling exercise:

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How can high availability help?

-In the above scenario if the onion service operator had setup a redundant, highly available server then connections would have been seamlessly sent to another server in the redundancy pool, thus preventing the adversary -from extracting location information based on their operation. This works best with a server in a different country or region, making a coordinated attack by several adversaries a requirement in order to use this method for deanonymization. - -

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Adversary Attack Flow

-Below is a chart depicting an adversary attack flow. As shown, high availability will prevent the adversary from progressing beyond their initial step of uptime-based target acquisition. -
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-As you can see the adversarie's playbook is quite simple: -

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  1. Identify a list of potential suspects
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  2. Cut them off the internet
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  3. Check whether this action made the hidden service unreachable
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-Those actions are easily perpetrated by law enforcement as they only require:
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-Both of those are trival to obtain for LEOs (law enforcement officers). - -

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-This Diagram shows where the attack takes place and how a redundant setup prevent such attacks from confirming the physical location of the hidden service. -
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-In conclusion, your hidden service is one downtime away from having its location disclosed to an adversary, so you need to make sure it has High Availability -

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