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add configuration steps for debian
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1 changed files with 82 additions and 120 deletions
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@ -220,6 +220,43 @@
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<h2>Tor Configuration</h2>
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<h3>On the Client</h3>
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run the following as root to create a hidden service for the prometheus collector
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<pre><code class="nim">
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apt update
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apt install prometheus-node-exporter tor
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systemctl stop tor #stop the tor service
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mkdir -p /var/lib/tor/onion/prometheus/authorized_clients #create the client auth keys folder to store our second layer of authentication
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chmod 400 -R /var/lib/tor/prometheus #set restrictive file permissions
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vi /etc/tor/torrc #edit the torrc file to add content
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cat /etc/tor/torrc
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AutomapHostsSuffixes .onion,.exit
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DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
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SOCKSPort 127.0.0.1:9050 IsolateDestAddr
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/onion/prometheus
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HiddenServicePort 9100 127.0.0.1:9100
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tor-client-auth-gen
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private_key=descriptor:x25519:DBQW3GP5FCN2KQBDKTDKDAQUQWBEGBZ5TFYJE4KTJFBUOJPKYZBQ #paste this key to your local machine as your prometheus node will need it
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echo "descriptor:x25519:6HDNHLLKIFNU5Q6T75B6Q3GBYDO5ZF4SQUX7EYDEKWNLPQUWUBTA" > /var/lib/tor/onion/prometheus/0.auth
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chown debian-tor:debian-tor -R /var/lib/tor # make tor owner of this folder
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systemctl start tor #restart tor
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systemctl status tor #check that everything works
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cat /var/lib/tor/onion/prometheus/hostname
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[clientaddr].onion
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</code></pre>
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<h3>On the aggregator</h3>
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The prometheus collector will only be accessed locally by grafana so it doesn't need to be accessible over tor. Grafana, on the other hand, does.
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<br>
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@ -230,155 +267,80 @@
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sudo systemctl stop tor #stop the tor service
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mkdir -p /var/lib/tor/auth_keys #create the client auth keys folder to store our second layer of authentication
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mkdir -p /var/lib/tor/onion/grafana #create the client auth keys folder to store our second layer of authentication
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chmod 400 -R /var/lib/tor/auth_keys #set restrictive file permissions
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chown tor:tor -R /var/lib/tor/auth_keys # make tor owner of this folder
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chmod 400 -R /var/lib/tor/onion #set restrictive file permissions
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vi /etc/tor/torrc #edit the torrc file to add content
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cat /etc/tor/torrc
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AutomapHostsSuffixes .onion,.exit
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DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
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SOCKSPort 127.0.0.1:9050 IsolateDestAddr
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/onion/grafana
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HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:3000
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ClientOnionAuthDir /var/lib/tor/auth_keys
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tor-client-auth-gen
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private_key=descriptor:x25519:YCPURSYN4FL4QKQSXFTGLYNBHOVVRCQYRZLFHMZFCUFU5R6DCRMQ
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public_key=descriptor:x25519:UUQW4LIO447WRQOSRSNDXEW5NZMSR3CYOP65ZIFWH6G2PUKWV5WQ
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echo "YCPURSYN4FL4QKQSXFTGLYNBHOVVRCQYRZLFHMZFCUFU5R6DCRMQ" > ~/mygrafana_auth_key
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echo "UUQW4LIO447WRQOSRSNDXEW5NZMSR3CYOP65ZIFWH6G2PUKWV5WQ" > /var/lib/tor/onion/grafana/0.auth
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chown debian-tor:debian-tor -R /var/lib/tor # make tor owner of this folder
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systemctl start tor #restart tor
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systemctl status tor #check that everything works
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</code></pre>
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and add the content below:
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And that's all you'll need! one hidden service for grafana. <br> You'll find your hostname in /var/lib/tor/onion/grafana/hostname.
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<pre><code class="nim">
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AutomapHostsSuffixes .onion,.exit
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DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
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SOCKSPort 127.0.0.1:9050 IsolateDestAddr
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/onion/grafana
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HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:2700
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ClientOnionAuthDir /var/lib/tor/auth_keys
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</code></pre>
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And that's all you'll need! one hiddn service for grafana. <br> You'll find your hostname in /var/lib/tor/onion/grafana/hostname.
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<h2>Prometheus server configuration</h2>
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clean and simple: we scrape our server every 10s for new data, configure a proxy URL so scraping happens over tor, using our socksport and configure ou scraping targets.
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<br>
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modify the prometheus.yml file (most likely located in /etc/prometheus)
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<pre><code class="nim">
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vi /etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml
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cat /etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml
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alerting:
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alertmanagers: []
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global:
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scrape_interval: 10s
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remote_read: []
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remote_write: []
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scrape_configs:
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- job_name: nodes
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- job_name: remote-nodes
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proxy_url: socks5h://localhost:9050
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static_configs:
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- labels: {}
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targets:
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- [fill later with our client .onion address]:9002
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- [clientaddr].onion:9100
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- job_name: local-node
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static_configs:
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- labels: {}
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targets:
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- localhost:9100
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</code></pre>
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<h1>Setting up the client</h1>
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On the client it's even easier.
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<h2>Grafana configuration</h2>
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<h2>Tor Configuration</h2>
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Since prometheus works on a pull model, you will need to expose your node exporter, no need for a socks proxy either.
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First let's start grafana and make it available: as root,
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<br>
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<pre><code class="nim">
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AutomapHostsSuffixes .onion,.exit
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DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/onion/prometheus
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HiddenServicePort 9002 127.0.0.1:9002
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</code></pre>
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docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name=grafana grafana/grafana-enterprise
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</code</pre>
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Next, you need to install the prometheus-node-exporter. Depending on your distribution of choice it's very likely it's in your package manager under that name.
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<br>
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As tor is already configured you can find your grafana url by looking at /var/lib/tor/onion/grafana/hostname
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<br><br>
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and here is how we will start it in our unit file (created in /etc/systemd/system/prometheus-node-exporter.service) : <br>
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<pre><code class="nim">
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[Unit]
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After=network.target
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[Service]
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CapabilityBoundingSet=
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DeviceAllow=
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DynamicUser=false
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ExecStart=/bin/node_exporter \
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--collector.systemd \
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\
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--web.listen-address 127.0.0.1:9002 --collector.ethtool --collector.softirqs --collector.tcpstat --collector.wifi
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Group=node-exporter
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LockPersonality=true
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MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
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NoNewPrivileges=true
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PrivateDevices=true
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PrivateTmp=true
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ProtectClock=false
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ProtectControlGroups=true
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ProtectHome=true
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ProtectHostname=true
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ProtectKernelLogs=true
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ProtectKernelModules=true
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ProtectKernelTunables=true
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ProtectSystem=strict
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RemoveIPC=true
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Restart=always
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_NETLINK
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET6
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RestrictNamespaces=true
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RestrictRealtime=true
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RestrictSUIDSGID=true
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RuntimeDirectory=prometheus-node-exporter
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SystemCallArchitectures=native
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UMask=0077
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User=node-exporter
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WorkingDirectory=/tmp
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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</code></pre>
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<br>
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Do note that the name of the executable might change based on your distribution. What it does:
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<br>
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<ul>
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<li> collect systemd data (services and so on)</li>
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<li> collect internet throughput data</li>
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<li> wifi information</li>
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<li> cpu interrupts information </li>
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</ul>
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And make them available to your server.
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<br><br>
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<b>Right now, if an attacker could find your hidden service URL they could harvest this data about your server, you need to secure it by adding a key that will only allow your aggregator to connect</b><br>
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Let's generate a keypair:
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<pre><code class="nim">
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user@computer$ tor-client-auth-gen
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private_key=descriptor:x25519:3B6CE5X4I4XGXA5TDQWQONLLAJ6B5FQNPTBOFSF4AN6K6AJUXBOQ
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public_key=descriptor:x25519:H7O5I7HUGLFM4IMPHNRN6L4S6TG4KJYDBXTYGOYJOUHH5NXVPJVA
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</code></pre>
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The private_key line must be copied to the following path on your prometheus aggregator: /var/lib/tor/auth_keys/prometheus.auth_private, prepended with your target onion address like this<br>
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<pre><code>
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mymonitoredserver.onion:descriptor:x25519:3B6CE5X4I4XGXA5TDQWQONLLAJ6B5FQNPTBOFSF4AN6K6AJUXBOQ
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</code></pre>
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The public_key must be added on the monitored server at the following path: /var/lib/tor/prometheus/authorized_clients/server.auth with the following content<br>
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<pre><code>
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descriptor:x25519:H7O5I7HUGLFM4IMPHNRN6L4S6TG4KJYDBXTYGOYJOUHH5NXVPJVA
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</code></pre>
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That way, only your monitoring server will be able to authenticate and scrape data from your monitored server.
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<br><br>
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Grafana has its own authentication system and database, still it reamins a critical service and it's not immune from 0 days and vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to obtain access. In order to apply a <b>defense in depth</b> principle we are going to do the same exercise for it:
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<pre><code class="nim">
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user@computer$ tor-client-auth-gen
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private_key=descriptor:x25519:FD7NAZTGZAXA6CTXNXR3JCVSKAPW23EP5EQOUMXKRQCKACEVUJ7A
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public_key=descriptor:x25519:OBIIXC3MWQ4VCEUS7Z6LOMOQG3CFP77SSWE45EDITP55WHVZFM6Q
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</code></pre>
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We'll put the public key on our monitoring server at /var/lib/tor/grafana/authorized_clients/admin.auth <br>
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and our public key on our whonix workstation at /var/lib/tor/auth_keys/grafana.auth_private <br>
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That way, even if an attacker discovers your grafana instance URL and has in their possession either your password or an exploit allowing them to do an authentication bypass
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they still won't be able to get in unless they also break the encryption underpinning the tor network.
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Now let's configure a couple of dashboards
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</p>
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