diff --git a/opsec/phonenumbers/faraday.png b/opsec/phonenumbers/faraday.png
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diff --git a/opsec/phonenumbers/index.html b/opsec/phonenumbers/index.html
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Great, you now think that you obtained an anonymous phone number right ? Did you just forget that there is a permanent record of where that simcard and phone number is, at all times ? And did you forget that this record of where your simcard is, is always consulted by LE at all times ?
Where do you plan to use that simcard ? At your own house ? The moment that simcard (and phone number) becomes active, LE knows that the simcard associated with that phone number is located your own house. And then you take it with you to go to work ? If you are seen going anywhere at anytime, and LE looks at where the simcard went, they can easily correlate that you are the owner of that simcard.
+Make no mistake with cellular tower triangulation they can pinpoint the location of a cellphone down to a few meters of precision, so it is preety accurate. Let's see what that looks like by taking Bob's phone location over the course of one day:
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+If you keep your phone on, then an adversary with your phone number and the required level of access can pinpoint your location over time simply by asking the phone provider for your data, without you being aware of it.
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+ But what if I use a burner phone I keep in a faraday bag when not in use?
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+You might think that having stringent SOPS (standard operating procedures) around the use of burner phones in your organization could solve this problem. It does help as this map shows, but it's not enough. An adversary investigating your activities will have access to a lot of data and they will be able to use tools such as PostGIS to query their datasets in order to infer relible position information from scattered datapoints.
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+
The Protest
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+On the last day of december 2024, protest happened in Los Angeles. This event will be referred to as the the Protest.
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+From your point of view
+Using burner phones and cash payments, you rented a car under a false identity with Alice and Bob, both members of your organizations. You have strong OPSEC, you don't know each other's names or faces and keep your burner phones off and in faraday bags when not in use. You took this car to a specific place at a specific time in order to acomplish a goal that goes contrary to the policies and aims of a strong adversary. Your adversary has access to phone data and no meaningful budget limitations, they aim to identify you, physically locate you and then follow their policies.
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+ From the adversary's point of view
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+Starting information:
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+ - They have identified where the car was rented from
+ - They have identified one suspect: Alice who was caught on camera being careless with their cap while renting the car
+ - They have identified one other potential suspect of the three-persons team, a known associate of Alice, Bob
+ - They need to identify you, the third member
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+What happened
+Luckily, your OPSEC was flawless. Shades, cap, tradecraft, you have managed to stay under the radar. They know you exist from a blurry trafic cam picture but that's all.
+You did use your burner phone only when required.
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+What will the adversary do?
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+ - Create a set of suspect sim cards based on spatial coordinates and timestamps: was this sim card in the same place and at the same time as Alice or Bob?
+ - Refine this set by correlating it with other spatial coordinates and timestamps: when the car was rented, when the protest took place
+ - Look for behaviourial anomalies: a sim card popping up in one place, disappearing for days and then reappearing later
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+They can quickly reduce their suspect pool from hundreds of thousands of people to a dozen using this method (see the concept of Anonymity Odds). If you were to make the mistake of reusing the same SIM card for another operation (such as simply taking out the phone while being at your own house) after the protest you will have dramatically increased your chances of being identified by the adversary.
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+As shown on the above map, once a Sim card goes on, even if the phone is later shut off it will still leave a data trail.
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+With each datapoint, an adversary will be able to reduce the pool of potential suspects until they have enough certainty to start using active measures.
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The only way to have an anonymous phone number, is remotely
If you have a simcard next to you, no matter how anonymous you managed to get it, the moment you start to use it, you are deanonymized
diff --git a/opsec/phonenumbers/map.dia b/opsec/phonenumbers/map.dia
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+ #/home/urist/Downloads/map.png#
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+ #2024-12-13 1432 - 1500
+possible meeting with suspect X#
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+ #2024-12-17 1447 - 1503
+House of suspect W, alleged coconspirator
+behind incident Z.
+SIM card activated the day following incident Z#
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+ #2024-12-16 1729 - 1821
+car used during incident Z rented from here
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diff --git a/opsec/phonenumbers/normal_map.dia b/opsec/phonenumbers/normal_map.dia
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diff --git a/opsec/phonenumbers/normal_map.png b/opsec/phonenumbers/normal_map.png
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