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finish bmc attack
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@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ in this post we are going to do a threat modelling exercise:<br><br>
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<h2><b>BMC Exploitation</b></h2>
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<h3>Attack</h3>
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A malicious firmware update is deployed to the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC), providing stealthy persistent access and enabling future compromise of the OS or hypervisor.
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<h3>Countermeasures</h3>
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This attack has the same issue as the previous one and could be deployed during a schedule maintenance at Bob's datacenter even if Alice was using a baremetal. If she were to migrate to such a setup, then ensuring a TPM is present on the motheboard and only signed firmware updates are accepted would be a first step. This wouldn't protect her from a malicious update signed with a legitimate key as some government agency could deploy.
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