diff --git a/opsec/qubesos/index.html b/opsec/qubesos/index.html index 267095b..a3e931a 100644 --- a/opsec/qubesos/index.html +++ b/opsec/qubesos/index.html @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@

Qubes OS is designed to have a basket of different VMs with different trust level, and has a very easy menu in GUI to manage the network of these VMs. Qubes OS also has built-in firewall function to stop unexpected leaks. In short, it is less likely for you to make mistakes in Qubes

For example if you want to have many different network configs like below link to satisfy your different online identities, Qubes OS is the right tool.

Theories about building up your online identities. Check this theory about online identities, with Qubes OS you can easily build up chains of vm for doing whatever you want, for example different combination of vpn/proxy/tor

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A image that shows Qubes OS with different vm for different functions and identities

2.Integrated Whonix

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This is the official hardware compatibility list, but be aware it is definitely incomplete, since people runs Qubes OS without problem mostly do not bother to report their config https://www.qubes-os.org/hcl/

For laptops, you should be careful, you better get a mainstream business laptop. I tried many installations on Lenovo or hp business laptops from recent years, they all worked fine. However, you should especially try to avoid laptops from non-traditional vendors like Xiaomi or whatever Chinese brand, and any gaming laptop with very peculiar gpu setup.

Next thing is to download the installation ISO, go to their website and download

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Download the ISO and hash digest

Next thing is to verify your ISO file is authentic, Qubes OS has a very detailed guide on how to do that so there is no need for me to build the wheel again https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/

I will paste the master key fingerprint here for comparison:427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494

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Next if you are on UEFI mode you need to enable "CSM". https://superuser.com/questions/1284392/what-exactly-is-uefi-with-csm-boot-mode. You also need to find that in your bios menu, it should usually appear below boot options. This can fix a lot of potential troubles later

Final thing is remembering to turn on vt-x or cpu virtualization support, since this is needed for Qubes. Check your bios, if there is a setting called IOMMU, you also need to enable that

For example, you can expect something look like this

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Finally, reboot and choose your usb as a boot device

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If things worked correctly, you should see a menu like this, just click enter and wait

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At this step, click "continue", if your computer is fully compatible and all bios settings are correct, you should see no warning message, otherwise go back to check bios again. If your computer is not some ancient stuff it should be compatible

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At this step you need to config the disk, click the installation destination

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If you are installing on a fresh drive just check the three areas on the pictures

Next is to choose a disk encryption password, notice this is the password used to encrypt your disk and is the only thing protects you when FBI kicks your door, so make sure it is strong enough

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Select "delete all" and "reclaim space", make sure you backed up everything!

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Next create a user with password, this is the password you will use to unlock the screen

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Next choose "Begin Installation", and just wait until it is completed.

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Post Install Setup



You still cannot use your qubes at this step, since you need to run post install setup.

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These configs in most situation do not need to be changed, however if you are using wired connection you can make sys-net disposable, this increases your security a little bit.

If you are using wireless network through a usb dongle you might need to choose "Use sys-net qube for both networking and USB devices"

You can also enable system and template update over tor, but this will make it significantly slower for big updates. And there is no need to touch the advanced configuration.

Click done and let the scripts run, do not interrupt it by closing your computer, it might seem unresponsive for a while.

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And finally we get our Qubes, in next tutorial we will start to compartmentalize our online activities by creating different qubes.

Next tutorial : How to use qubes for different online activities

diff --git a/opsec/qubesosnetwork/6.png b/opsec/qubesosnetwork/6.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e0f3b8 Binary files /dev/null and b/opsec/qubesosnetwork/6.png differ diff --git a/opsec/qubesosnetwork/index.html b/opsec/qubesosnetwork/index.html index fcca9d1..6e9f02d 100644 --- a/opsec/qubesosnetwork/index.html +++ b/opsec/qubesosnetwork/index.html @@ -79,12 +79,12 @@

0.Xen: Everything that Qubes OS built on this, a type 2 hyervisor

1.qube: That is basically a vm, each qube is intended to do a single task for isolation. But it is not quite like the common vm you used to see on vmware or virtualbox

2.dom0: This is the admin vm, it is still a vm, but it is very special vm with all the tools to control the entire machine. It never connects to the network and no files from other qubes should touch it, once it gets compromised you are done

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3.Template VM: Template VM is like the concept of "class" in programming language, you will install all the applications you like in template vm, and appvm will simply share the root partition with the template vm, so appvm only needs to keep its own /home directory, this greatly saves disk space and time you spent on software update.

Template VM do not connect to network by default for safety, since if they are compromised all the app vm spawned by them are also done. Updates are conducted through a special proxy so attack surface is minimized

4.App VM: Lightweight VM spawned from template VM, any changes done to root partition will not persist across boot, it is meant to only use software installed from template VM and save your work in /home

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5.PVH: a para virtualization mode, which means some costly actions are not performed in the vm, instead they are done in the host through a special interface to make vm runs faster

Most qubes will run under PVH mode

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Network Setup



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Network blueprint



Qubes already comes with many default qubes, you can find them inside the qubes manager

On the desktop, right click and choose "Open terminal here", you will get a terminal in dom0

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Input "qubes-qube-manager", and click enter you will get the qubes manager

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Now we are going to explain these default qubes

0.Template qubes

Qubes with the name "debian-12-xfce", "fedora-40-xfce", "whonix*" are template vms, you can install software in these template qubes, and use them in the app qubes

1.sys-usb

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A qube that did not connect to network, and is responsible for providing usb service only, if you have usb keyboard or mouse it might also proxy the input for you. In some circumstances when you have an usb wifi dongle it also becomes the factual network qube

This is installed by default and is a disposable vm

1.sys-net

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This is where everything starts, you need to passthrough your Ethernet adapter(wired or wireless) to a qube, and that qube will be used to as a first part in the network chain

Since it is directly in contact with network adapter and the routers, it should be considered as untrusted because it is exposed to a lot of uncertain stuff

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2.sys-firewall

The qube that separate the rest of your network chain from the sys-net for better security, and it is also the qube that enforces firewall rules if you have vpn qube directly behind it.

If you have any public identity it is best to directly connect it to sys-firewall, for example online banking

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Each qube can select its own network qube, if none is selected it will not have internet at all. sys-firewall here set sys-net as its network qube

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And any qube provides network service need to enable provides network in advanced tab below "Run in debug mode"

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Any qube directly connect to sys-firewall will have your home isp ip address, best suited for public activity, for example online banking

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Let's go back to our qubes manager, click "New qube" in the top left corner

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First name it as "banking", and we assign it with Yellow tag, since it is for banking identities, so yellow is a medium trust score for me. Color tag is a very important feature of qubes, every qube has its own color tag for avoiding you accidentally type something sensitive in a insecure vm. Dom0 always has the special White tag

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For Type and Template I just leave it as AppVM and fedora-40-xfce, since this is exactly what I want

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For networking, I choose "sys-firewall", since I want my bank to see my home ip address instead of my vpn ip and get my account banned

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Now click ok and the qube will be created, you can find your qube app menu on the top left Q icon, then we can open firefox and start banking

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3.vpn qube

A qube setup with vpn profile, redirect all the traffic to your designated vpn server. Ideal for providing a pseudonymous identity. If applied with firewall rules it can be guaranteed leakproof

Qubes OS works fine with wireguard and openvpn cli programs, but for vpn vendor's own gui there might be problems, sometimes those apps break the dns setup in qubes

Mullvad has a very detailed tutorial on how to setup a vpn qube https://mullvad.net/en/help/wireguard-on-qubes-os. However, iptables mentioned in it is already deprecated by Qubes, but it still works without DNS hijack config.

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If you have any pseudonymous activities it is best to connect behind vpn qube, for example torrenting

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First we start a template vm, for example debian in this case, and install transmission

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After installation enter "sudo poweroff" to shut down the qube, make sure it is shutdown, since your changes in template qube only get reflected when it is shutdown at least once!

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Next go back to qubes manager, and create a new qube called torrent, I assume you already set up a vpn qube according to the mullvad tutorial mentioned above

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First give it a name called "torrent", and I personally think this qube has a medium trust score, so it is given a yellow tag.

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We still leave it as appvm, and choose template as debian, since this is the template we just installed transmission

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Most importantly set the networking to vpn qube you just setup, if you do not want DMCA notice get sent to your home. Then click ok, and the qube will be created

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For accessing transmission app easily, we will add the transmission app into our "Q" menu which is in the top left corner

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Right click the torrent qube in the manager, choose "settings", and choose "application"

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Find "Transmission" on the left, click it, and click the ">" icon in the middle, then click ok. Now transmission will be visible in the app menu

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Now happy torrenting

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4.whonix qubes

Whonix is the best part of qubes, it makes tor very easy to use. Whonix qubes consists of two parts, first is whonix gateway, which onionize all the network traffic behind it. Whonix workstation is a workstation specifically tuned for anonymity, and is usually disposable for increased security

You can also hook up other non workstation qubes behind whonix gateway in rare circumstances, for example a windows qube, but you should be careful and should have a specialized gateway qube only for this.

This is the ideal place for all the high risk activities like all the darknet stuff

You might choose to whether or not to put whonix gateway behind a vpn

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Here we use whonix workstation to access dread for exploring the darknet

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Try to find something names "whonix-workstation-17-dvm" in the qubes menu, click "Tor Browser(AnonDist)", and you will get a disposable vm running tor browser. This is great since anything happen inside this vm get destroyed after you shut down the browser

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If you see something as disp on the vm windows title, then you are on a disposable vm, congrats!

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Setup the vm according to network blueprint

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Now we are about to setup the qubes according to the previous network blueprint, we are about to setup a banking vm, torrent vm, and darknet vm

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And they fit in different places of our network identity threat model obviously

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Banking VM

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Let's go back to our qubes manager, click "New qube" in the top left corner

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First name it as "banking", and we assign it with Yellow tag, since it is for banking identities, so yellow is a medium trust score for me. Color tag is a very important feature of qubes, every qube has its own color tag for avoiding you accidentally type something sensitive in a insecure vm. Dom0 always has the special White tag

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For Type and Template I just leave it as AppVM and fedora-40-xfce, since this is exactly what I want

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For networking, I choose "sys-firewall", since I want my bank to see my home ip address instead of my vpn ip and get my account banned

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Now click ok and the qube will be created, you can find your qube app menu on the top left Q icon, then we can open firefox and start banking

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Torrent VM

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First we start a template vm, for example debian in this case, and install transmission

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After installation enter "sudo poweroff" to shut down the qube, make sure it is shutdown, since your changes in template qube only get reflected when it is shutdown at least once!

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Next go back to qubes manager, and create a new qube called torrent, I assume you already set up a vpn qube according to the mullvad tutorial mentioned above

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First give it a name called "torrent", and I personally think this qube has a medium trust score, so it is given a yellow tag.

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We still leave it as appvm, and choose template as debian, since this is the template we just installed transmission

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Most importantly set the networking to vpn qube you just setup, if you do not want DMCA notice get sent to your home. Then click ok, and the qube will be created

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For accessing transmission app easily, we will add the transmission app into our "Q" menu which is in the top left corner

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Right click the torrent qube in the manager, choose "settings", and choose "application"

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Find "Transmission" on the left, click it, and click the ">" icon in the middle, then click ok. Now transmission will be visible in the app menu

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Now happy torrenting

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Darknet VM

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Here we use whonix workstation to access dread for exploring the darknet

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If you follow the default setting during the installation config, you should have disposable whonix workstation installed by default, which means we do not need to create anything

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Try to find something named "whonix-workstation-17-dvm" in the qubes Q menu, click "Tor Browser(AnonDist)", and you will get a disposable vm running tor browser. This is great since anything happen inside this vm get destroyed after you shut down the browser

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If you see something as disp on the vm windows title, then you are on a disposable vm, congrats!

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Tips



There are some tricky problems about qube, like how to copy and paste text between qubes, and how to transfer files, or how to use usb.

For copy text, there is a master pasteboard in dom0, once you copy some text normally inside a qube, click shift+ctrl+c, then the text get transferred to the master pasteboard, and go to the vm you want to paste, click shift+ctrl+v, then the text is inside the clipboard of your destination vm

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For example you first copy some text inside a vm, then click SHIFT+CTRL+C

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Then you will see a message about Global Clipboard

Go to your destination vm and click CTRL+SHIFT+V, then you will see a message says Global Clipboard wiped

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Then just paste as normal

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For copying file between vm you need to use qvm-copy command inside the vm

First we created a test file called "new_file"

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Then we use "qvm-copy" command, and choose "banking" vm in the dom0 prompt.

qvm-copy new_file

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Then you can see the new_file in banking vm

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Files from other VM are all located inside ~/QubesIncoming

Other stuff are inside the official document, no need to rebuild the wheels again

diff --git a/opsec/qubesosnetwork/threat_level.png b/opsec/qubesosnetwork/threat_level.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a46cec9 Binary files /dev/null and b/opsec/qubesosnetwork/threat_level.png differ