wip opsec neutralization

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MulliganSecurity 2025-05-17 19:53:06 +02:00
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@ -117,5 +117,16 @@ Your general operations rules should have built-in detection capacities: either
- An easy to use counter-itelligence tool is the [baryum meal test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canary_trap) or canary trap. By detecting leaks you can use them in anti-surveillance operations or as a warning system. - An easy to use counter-itelligence tool is the [baryum meal test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canary_trap) or canary trap. By detecting leaks you can use them in anti-surveillance operations or as a warning system.
- another one is a simple canary (example: [warrant canary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary)) where the cessation of an inoccuous action is used to send a message - another one is a simple canary (example: [warrant canary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary)) where the cessation of an inoccuous action is used to send a message
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Delego #### What good OPSEC looks like
Let's talk about [Operation Delego](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Delego), a major CSAM-sharing and production group was infiltrated in a joint operation conducted by 19 countries. This group counted more than 600 members and had strict operational security:
- Periodic platform change (new hidden service)
- With each platform change, all users would change pseudonyms and receive new, randomly generated ones
- Required use of GnuPG for encrypting communications
- Never share PII
- Strict metadata scrubbing policy for all shared media
- Only share media over the trusted website channels
##### The neutralization operation
After infiltrating the group, Leo managed to trick several users into directly sharing media and personal information other unsanctioned channels, without encryption.